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TOWARD A LAW OF ACADEMIC STATUS
MATrHEw W. FINKIN*

INRODucrION

T

he history of judicial treatment of institutional disputes concerning professorial rights or privileges has not been earmarked by a
consistent or particularly sensitive legal theory.' As William Murphy
pointed out, a body of decisional law dating from the days "before tenure plans came into widespread use and acceptance, at a time when employer prerogatives in all areas were largely unlimited, and professors too were considered to be mere hired hands"2 provided little protection for the professoriate. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held,
for example, that the statutory power of a governing board to remove a faculty member at its pleasure comprised a part of the professor's contract of employment; a contract of appointment of a year's
duration was held therefore as beyond the board's power, although it
did observe a thirty day notice of termination provision.3 A similar
notice provision was held to be beyond the governing board's authority by one court, reasoning that if the board could bind itself for three
4
months, it could bind itself for a year or longer
Two cases of more recent vintage, arising in the Dakotas, reflect
* A.B., Ohio Wesleyan, 1963; LL.B., N.Y.U., 1967.
Graduate Fellow, Yale University Law School. On leave from position as Associate
Counsel, AAUP. The opinions herein expressed are not necessarily those of the Association.
1. See, e.g., C. BYSE & L. JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 71

(1959); Fellman, Academic Freedom and the Law, 1961 Wis. L. REv.3; Note, Academic
Freedom and the Law, 46 YALE L.J. 670 (1937).

2. Murphy, Educational Freedom in the Courts, 49 AAUP BULL. 309, 312 (1963).
3. Gilan v. Board of Regents, 88 Wis. 7, 58 N.W. 1042 (1894). See also Head v.
University, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 526 (1873); Hyslop v. Board of Regents, 23 Idaho 341,
129 P. 1073 (1913); University of Mississippi v. Deister, 115 Miss. 469, 76 So. 526
(1917) ; Hartigan v. Board of Regents, 49 W. Va. 14, 38 S.E. 698 (1901).
4. Devol v. Board of Regents, 6 Ariz. 259, 56 P. 737 (1899). But see Board of
Regents v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 223 (1878); State Bd. of Agriculture v. Meyers, 20 Colo.
App. 139, 77 P. 372 (1904) (which allowed recovery of damages for the notice period
required by board regulation which was held to be within its statutory power).
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the continuing confrontation of the 19th century perspective with the
realities of 20th century academic life. In Posin v. State Board of
Higher Education,5 a state statute provided for the establishment of
rules and regulations for the governance of the institution by the
faculty, subject to the rules established by the board. Accordingly, the
faculty of North Dakota Agricultural College adopted a tenure plan
which was approved by the board. When four tenured professors
sought review of their dismissals, the court held that the tenure regulations could not limit the "full authority" to dismiss faculty granted to
the governing board. In Worzella v. Board of Regents," the Supreme
Court of South Dakota held the tenure system adopted by the governing board for the South Dakota state colleges to be an unlawful delegation of the board's power to employ and dismiss and thus denied relief to a professor who had acquired tenure under the regulations and
who had been dismissed without adherence to the procedures provided
in them.
In private institutions a similar perspective was reflected in Bradley v. New York University,7 which involved the dismissal of a professor of more than twenty years' service who had been convicted of contempt of Congress for failure to produce records of an organization of
which he had been an officer and which had been subpoenaed by a congressional committee. New York University had adopted a "Statement
of Policy in Regard to Academic Freedom and Tenure" contained
in the University's Faculty Handbook. It provided in pertinent part:
The Council [Board of Trustees] of New York University has authorized the following statement of policy in regard to academic freedom
and tenure at New York University. It should be emphasized that this
is a statement of policy and not a draft of a contract between the
Council of the University on the one hand and the University Senate
for and on behalf of present and future members of the University staff
on the other hand.8
5.

86 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1957).

6. 77 S.D. 447, 93 N.W.2d 411 (1958). For a critique of this decision see Byse,
Academic Freedom, Tenure and the Law: A Comment on Worzell v. Board of Regents,
73 HARv. L. REv. 304 (1959). For an irgument that the absence of legal enforceability
of tenure is not essential to its maintenance see Academic Tenure at South Dakota's
State Supported Colleges and University, 5 S.D. L. Rev. 31 (1960).
7. 124 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd mem., 283 App. Div. 671, 127 N.Y.S.2d
845, aff'd, 307 N.Y. 620, 120 N.E.2d 828 (1954).
8. Id. at 242.
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The court held that the Statement of Policy took effect subsequent to
the dismissal and thus the aggrieved faculty member could not claim
the benefit of it. As an alternative ground, however, the court concluded that the express language indicated that the Statement did not
create a binding obligation. 9
It was in this largely inhospitable context that the profession
moved to establish its standards of academic freedom and tenure and
secure institutional acceptance of them in practice if not at law. The
last full codification of these norms is found in the 1940 Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure' ° drafted jointly by
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the
Association of American Colleges (AAC) and now officially endorsed
by eighty-two educational organizations and disciplinary societies. It
has been supplemented by additional statements and by a set of formal Interpretive Comments issued by the AAUP, and AAC in 1970.
Moreover, the AAUP offers advice and assistance pursuant to these
standards and when requested will attempt to mediate disputes arising under them. In situations involving serious possible departures
from the 1940 Statement which have proved resistent to settlement,
the Association undertakes investigation through an ad hoc committee reporting to its national Committee A on Academic Freedom and
Tenure." The national committee reviews the conclusions of its
ad hoc investigating committees and the published reports constitute
a body of professional "common" or customary law of academic free12
dom and tenure.
9. The decision is obscured even more by the court's *conclusion that the procedural requirements of the Statement were adhered, to in any event and that no departure from its terms had been shown.
10. The Statement may be found in POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 1-4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
POLICY DOCUMENTS], accompanied by the Interpretive Comments. For treatment of the
1940 Statement in the history of academic freedom and tenure see R. HOFSTADTER & W.
METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 480-90

(1955).
11. For an outline of the Association's case procedures see ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
11-29 (L. Joughin ed. 1969).
12. For a further discussion of the role of the 1940 Statement in higher education
see Belasco, The American Association of University Professors: A Private Dispute
Settlement Agency, 18 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 535 (1965); Developments in the LawAcademic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1105-12 (1968); Emerson & Haber,
Academic Freedom and the Faculty Member as a Citizen, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM: THE
SCHOLAR'S PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY 95, 104 (Baade ed. 1964).
AND TENURE:
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The development of this scheme of private ordering was accompanied by some hesitation on the part of the professional association
to seek actively judicial redress. As Robert Carr pointed out, one
reason was the organization's concern that "what the courts give,
they may take away, and that having thus given and taken away,
academic freedom may be left in a weaker position than it was before
it became a concern of the law."' 3 Another was the preference for internal regulation over review by bodies which had not demonstrated
4
sensitivity to academic values.'
In light of recent moves by the United States Supreme Court
to expand the constitutional rights of public employees, including
professors employed in publicly operated institutions of higher learning, the theory of academic freedom has begun to be reassessed.', As
a result there has emerged a view of academic freedom as itself an
aspect of the Constitution, focusing first on institutional action taken
due to the professor's activities as a citizen, and more recently viewing substantive "on-the-job" academic freedom as a subset of first
amendment rights.' 6
This discussion will juxtapose the profession' customary standards with developing constitutional doctrine on these two issues. It
will then turn to nonconstitutional means of protecting academic
interests and will discuss an emerging body of cases dealing with the
contractual rights of university faculty. In both the constitutional and
nonconstitutional areas it will appear that established academic custom and practice may play a significant role.
13. Carr, Academic Freedom, The American Association of University Professors,
and The United States Supreme Court,45 AAUP BULL. 5, 20 (1959).
14. See, e.g., Kay v. Board of Higher Educ., 173 Misc. 943, 18 N.Y.S.2d 821
(Sup. Ct. 1940), in holding illegal the appointment of Bertrand Russell to the City
College of New York as a "direct violation of the public health, safety, and morals of
the people . . . ." Id. at 953, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 831. See also Jones v. Board of Control,
131 S.2d 713 (Fla. 1961) (dicta concerning academic freedom).
15. Fract, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 27
(1969); Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, in ACAnana
FREEDOM: TUE SCHoLA's PLACE IN MODERN SociETY, supra note 12, at 17; Pettigrew,
"Constitutional Tenure:" Toward a Realization of Academic Freedom, 22 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 475 (1971); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DurE L.J. 841.
16. Van Alstyne, A Comment on the Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and
the General Issue of Civil Liberty, to appear in 405 ANNALS (1972). The author
is indebted to Professor Van Alstyne for making a copy of his manuscript available.
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I. CONSrrrUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Freedom as a Citizen
The 1940 Statement provides in pertinent part:
The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned
profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he
speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional
censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community
imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his
profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should
at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint,
should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make
every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.17
In 1963 an ad hoc committee investigating the dismissal of a
professor at the University of Illinois for writing a letter to the student press concerning student sexual conduct, concluded that the
1940 Statement's standard of "academic responsibility" was in essence admonitory and could not itself serve as a basis for discipline. 18
A majority of Committee A disagreed.' 9 The position of the Committee has, however, been modified in subsequent statements of policy. The recently appended Interpretive Comments, for example, incorporate language from Committee A's Statement on Extramural
Utterancesissued in 1964:
The controlling principle is that a faculty member's expression of
opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless
it clearly demonstrates the faculty member's unfitness for his position.
Extramural utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member's fitness
for his position. Moreover, a final decision should take into account
the faculty member's entire record as a teacher and scholar.2 0
Further clarification is provided in the model institutional regulations approved by Committee A requiring that
Adequate cause for a dismissal will be related directly and substantially, to the fitness of the faculty member in his professional capacity
17. POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 2.
18. Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of Illinois, 49 AAUP BULL. 25
(1963).
19. Id. at 40-43.
20. POLicY DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 3.
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as a teacher and researcher. Dismissal will not be used to restrain faculty members in the exercise of academic freedom or other rights
of American citizens.21
Professor William Van Alstyne has argued, however, that a professor's aprofessional utterances as a citizen should be viewed as being
outside the doctrine of academic freedom. To apply a professional
standard of care, as the 1940 Statement appears to do, is to hold the
professor to a higher standard than the average citizen and is, in effect,
to invite institutional scrutiny of his aprofessional activities. 22
Some support for this argument is provided by the action of
the Board of Regents of the University of California which relied
explicitly on the "academic responsibility" provisions of the 1940
Statement in deciding not to renew the appointment of Acting Assistant Professor Angela Davis in the University of California at Los
Angeles. 23 The Board concluded that some of Miss Davis' extramural
utterances were "so extreme, so antithetical to the protection of academic freedom and so obviously and deliberately false in several respects as to be inconsistent with qualification for appointment" 2 ' to
the faculty.
The AAUP's investigating committee found that each of the
Board's specific allegations failed to withstand a literal analysis. More
important, the committee report pointed out that an infraction of
21. Id. at 16.
22. Van Alstyne, supra note 16. Professor Van Alstyne observes that the distinction
between professional and aprofessional activity can be elusive. Some cases do deal with activity which falls within an aprofessional categorization. See, e.g., Academic Freedom and
Tenure: A Successfully Resolved Case at Northern Michigan University, 55 AAUP BULL.
374 (1969) (active opposition to the university's plans for community redevelopment) ;
Academic Freedom and Tenure: Lincoln College, 50 AAUP BULL. 244 (1964) (picketing a U.S. post office in protest of the blockade of Cuba). Some cases deal with speech
or activity that is both aprofessional and apolitical. See, e.g., Academic Freedom and
Tenure: Broward Junior College (Fla.), 55 AAUP BULL. 71 (1969) (art instructor's
opinions on homosexuality), and Academic Freedom and Tenure: St. Mary's College
(Minn.), 54 AAUP BULL. 37 (1968) (lay faculty member marries in civil ceremony).
For a fuller discussion of the problems in this area, see O'Neil, The Private Lives of
Public Employees, 51 ORE. L. Rxv. 70 (1971). Other cases are more difficult to categorize. See, e.g., Academic Freedom and Tenure: Oklahoma State University, 56 AAUP
BULL. 62 (1970) (relationship of professor of journalism to the outside press on stories
concerning university affairs), and Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of
Hawaii, 55 AAUP BULL. 29 (1969) (role of faculty advisor to radical student organization). To the extent that a precise categorization may be required before the applicable
standard may be determined, the elusive case may prove troublesome.
23. Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of California at Los Angeles,
57 AAUP BULL. 382 (1971).
24. Id. at 415.
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AAUP standards as a basis for discipline must show not only irresponsibility in terms of that standard but also a necessary relationship
between the extramural utterance and the faculty member's fitness
for an academic position based on his entire record.
Thus, institutional sanctions imposed for extramural utterances can
be a violation of academic freedom even when the utterances themselves fall short of the standards of the profession; for it is central
to that freedom that the faculty member, when speaking as a citizen, "should be free from institutional censorship or discipline" except insofar as his behavior is shown,25on the whole record, to be incompatible with fitness for his position.
In sum, while the "academic responsibility" aspect of the 1940
Statement does imply a degree of institutional accountability for aprofessional utterance, it is clear that such utterance does no more than
invite attention in rare cases to the faculty member's fitness on which
latter question alone would institutional action be warranted. The
difficulty with this position, according to Van Alstyne, is that it seems
to imply a higher degree of institutional accountability than is desirable and suggests that the operative constitutional standard is narrower
than that implied by AAUP standards.
The constitutional standard is best adumbrated in Pickering v.
Board of Education,26 which held that a teacher's speech on issues
of public importance could not furnish the basis for dismissal from
public employment absent proof of false statements knowingly or
recklessly made. The decision is, however, carefully limited. The Court
is at pains to note: (1) it is not appropriate to lay down a general
standard to judge public utterances made by public employees which
may be critical of their superiors; and, (2) a balancing of interests
between the teacher as citizen and the state as employer must be made.2 7
The Court then delineates the considerations weighed in its decision:
(1) a close working relationship with the person or persons against
whom the statements are directed posing a problem of discipline or
harmony was not involved; (2) the utterance did not actually foment
controversy or conflict (the Court noted that the letter involved was
greeted with "massive apathy and total disbelief" and had earlier noted
that no evidence of the effect of the publication on the community or
25. Id. at 398.
26. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
27. Id. at 568-69.
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on the administration of the school system had been introduced);
(3) the subject of the public utterance was a matter of legitimate public concern on which open debate is vital, particularly as the matter
was the subject of a popular vote; and, (4) the inaccuracies in the
utterance concerned matters of public record about which the teach28
er's employment did not lend greater authority than any other citizen.
Thus the Pickering standard would require a showing that the
teacher's extramural utterance or activity either impeded the performance of the teacher's duties or interfered with the regular operation
of the school. Dismissal for criticizing a school's emphasis on athletics
in a learned journal would state a constitutional claim 20 as would the
denial of a salary increase for publishing a letter in Redbook magazine in which the author identifies himself as a professor at a public
institution, praises an article on premarital sex, and expresses intent
to use the author's comments in class.80 Neither of these cases seem
to depart from what would be otherwise protected by customary
standards. Alternatively, the nonrenewal of a high school teacher who
created animosities with other teachers, used profanity, was abusive
and inebriated on teacher social occasions, and who used his classroom as a forum to promote the activities of a teacher union "to
sanction polygamy, to attack marriage, to criticize other teachers and
to sway and influence the minds of young people without a full and
proper explanation of both sides of the issue," 1 was held to run
afoul of Pickering standards. On the other hand, the use of college
letterhead to charge the institution with unethical practices in a communication to the state psychological association could, it seems,
be properly relied on in part by college authorities in a decision not
82
to renew a faculty member for "lack of judgment."
It is particularly noteworthy that the Pickering Court observed
in a footnote that the utterances involved were not
so without foundation as to call into question [the faculty member's]
28. Professor Van Alstyne has been highly critical of portions of the Pickering test;
see Van Alstyne, supra note 15.

29. Williams v. School Dist. of Springfield, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969).
30. Jarvey v. Martin, 336 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Va. 1972).
31. Knarr v. Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832, 836 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
32. Local 1600, AFT v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882, 888-89 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
93 S. Ct. 56 (1972). Cf. the treatment of use of college letterhead in a letter to the
headquarters of the Boys' Clubs of America to protest racial segregation in the local
Boys' Club in Magnolia, Arkansas, in Academic Freedom and Tenure: Southern State
College (Arkansas), 57 AAUP BULL. 40 (1971).
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fitness to perform his duties in the classroom. In such a case, of course,
the statements would merely be evidence of the teacher's general
competence, or lack thereof, and not an independent basis for dismissal. 3
Thus, while an extramural utterance would not constitute an independent basis for dismissal, it could raise a question of the teacher's
fitness and thereby lead to ultimate dismissal. This seems to be indistinguishable from the 1940 Statement as it has been refined and

applied.
Further, while the 1940 Statement limits any review occasioned
by aprofessional speech to the faculty member's fitness or competence
based on his entire record and not on a single incident alone, Pickering actually appears to pose a more restrictive standard by permitting such inquiry to focus on disruption of harmonious relations
within the institution or of its efficient operation.
Thus where
33. 391 U.S. at 573 n.5.
34. See Rozman v. Elliott, 335 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Neb. 1971) (nonrenewal of
nontenured professor who "intruded" himself into negotiations between students and
administration during occupancy by students of ROTC building); Knarr v. Board of
School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ind. 1970). Compare Jergeson v. Board of
Trustees, 476 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1970) (dismissal of high school teacher after hearing
on charges including the content of an issue of the student newspaper for which
he was faculty advisor and which, the court concludes, the trustees could find interfered
with the discipline of the school), with Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of Hawaii, supra note 22 (concerning the revocation of a letter of intent to
grant tenure to a professor who served as advisor to a student organization which
issued a statement calling for subversion of the military and a campaign to sabotage
the war effort in Vietnam).
Thus the cases following Pickering have perforce to concern themselves with
matters of working relationships, discipline and harmony. See Watts v. Seward School
Bd., 395 P.2d 372 (Alas. 1964), remanded, 381 U.S. 126 (1965), aff'd, 421 P.2d 586
(Alas. 1966), vacated and remanded in light of Pickering, 391 U.S. 592 (1968), aff'd,
454 P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969) (court found efforts of two teachers to oust the superintendent of schools were directed toward a person with whom they would be in working
contact and that a question of maintaining discipline was involved). See also Meehan
v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), remanded in light of Pickering, 425 F.2d 472
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (circulation of material critical of the governor of the Canal Zone
by a police officer relating to and during an international dispute); Tepedino v.
Dumpson, 24 N.Y.2d 705, 249 N.E.2d 751, 301 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1969) (suspension of
social worker for letter critical of department caseload and procedures directed to the
federal department of Health, Education and Welfare; Chief Judge Fuld points out
that there was no showing of interference with the welfare program, of neglect of duty,
or "that the letter created discipline problems or disharmony" among fellow employees,
id. at '710, 249 N.E.2d at 753, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 970; Puentes v. Board of Educ.,
18 N.Y.2d 906, 223 N.E.2d 45, 276 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1966), remanded in light of
Pickering, 392 U.S. 653 (1968), rev'd, 24 N.Y.2d 996, 250 N.E.2d 232, 302
N.Y.S.2d 824 (1969) (letter of criticism circulated within school system); Brukiewa v.
Police Comm'r, 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970) (police officer critical of the
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Pickering may become troublesome is in the area of internal utterances: i.e., where the faculty members speaks not as a private citizen to
an issue of general public interest but, in a sense, as an institutional
citizen criticizing the administration of the institution's affairs." It is
in this area that the application of the test of disharmony or interference requires an appreciation of the nature of a university, which
has not been lacking in some cases.36 Thus the profession's customary
standards deriving from the particular circumstances of higher learning may serve as a basis for modifying the potentially disturbing
aspects of Pickering. On the other hand, if Pickering is in effect a less
restrictive standard, it should serve to inform and thus modify the
profession's customary standard, which, in turn, could serve as an implied term in contracts of academic employment to which constitutional standards would be otherwise inapplicable.3 7
commissioner during television interview; the dissent would distinguish a policeman

from a teacher whose employment implies the "right to exercise the maximum of the
right of free speech," id. at 75, 263 A.2d at 299; In re Chalk, 441 Pa. 376, 272
A.2d 457 (1971) (suspension of social worker for speech critical of the agency and
urging recipients to agitate).
35. It is an area to which the AAUP's attention has been extensively directed.
See, e.g., Academic Freedom and Tenure: St. John's University (N.Y.), 52 AAUP BULL.
12 (1966) (use of public address system in University cafeteria to speak on administration-faculty relations and other activities petitioning or criticizing the administration);
Academic Freedom and Tenure: Amarillo College, 53 AAUP BULL. 292 (1967) (allegation of improper letter directed to members of the administration, inability to get
along with department chairman, and the making of derogatory remarks about the
college's former president during a farewell party); Academic Freedom and Tenure: Dean
Junior College, 53 AAUP BULL. 64 (1967) (continuance of faculty member was alleged
to make the work of incoming department head more difficult); Academic Freedom
and Tenure: Lorain County Community College (Elyria, Ohio), 54 AAUP BULL. 49
(1968) (nonrenewal due to opposition to the president's policy on securing regional
accreditation); Academic Freedom and Tenure: Southeastern Louisiana College, 55
AAUP BULL. 369 (1969) (termination of faculty member who had substantial friction
with his department head and who had a reputation for irritating the administration).
36. See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 347, 269 P.2d
265 (1954); State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959).
37. Constitutional standards have not been applied to private institutions under
the "state action" test. See O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO
L. REv. 155 (1970); Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24 RUTOERs L.
Rav. 323 (1970). The distinction appears to retain its vitality in higher education
despite anomalous results as in Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). See Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Brownley v. Gettysburg College,
338 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Rowe v. Chandler, 332 F. Supp. 336 (D. Kan.
1971) (College of Emporia). But see Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d
Cir. 1970) (where state law requiring the adoption of disciplinary rules by private
colleges was sufficient state action to compel constitutional compliance) and Ryan v.
Hofstra University, 67 Misc. 2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1971), order clarified,
68-Misc. 2d 890, 328 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1972) which, as an alternative ground,
clearly holds the fourteenth amendment applicable to a private institution on the basis
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B. Freedom "On-the-job"
A series of recent cases concerning secondary education now lends
support to the identification of substantive academic freedom as a
distinct subset of first amendment rights.
In Parducci v. Rutland8a a teacher had been dismissed for assigning Kurt Vonnegut's Welcome to the Monkey House to his eleventh grade class to acquaint them with the genre of the short story.
The court clearly identified academic freedom as a first amendment
right and relied on Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
0 as setting the guidelines for balancing the instituSchool District"
tional and individual interests in determining the result. Accordingly,
the court undertook to determine whether the assignment materially
and substantially interfered with the requirements of appropriate
discipline and concluded that it did not. 40 In so doing the court made
its own determination of the literary merit of the work and its own
findings of the degree of disruption occasioned by its use. In Keefe v.
Geanakos41 the First Circuit enjoined the suspension of a high school
teacher who had assigned an article in Atlantic Monthly to a senior
class. The text, by an apparently established psychiatrist, used a "vulgar term for an incestuous son" which was nevertheless found in five
books in the school library. The court found the article "scholarly,
thoughtful and thought-provoking" 42 and used for educational purof the university's general relationship to the state and the public interest in private
higher education. The excellent opinion is slightly marred, however, by the confusion
of the concept of institutional autonomy with academic freedom.
38. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). Contra, Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F.
Supp. 222 (D. Md.), aff'd on other grounds, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1030 (1966). But: "The need for teachers to have freedom in what they teach
rises from the very heart of the first amendment." Hostrop v. Board of Junior College
Dist. No. 515, 337 F. Supp. 977, 980 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
39. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40. It is curious that the court applies as a standard of on-the-job professional
utterance one developed for a nonprofessional political utterance. A similar result on seemingly nonconstitutional grounds was reached in Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Olicker,
25 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1st Dist. 1972) concerning whether a teacher's
distribution to an eighth grade class of their own writings, some of which concerned
blatantly sexual subjects, constituted "evident unfitness." The court rejected the constitutional argument but applied as a test whether the teaching technique "disrupted
or impaired the discipline of defendant's [teacher's] students or the teaching process."
Id. at 1110, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30. The court concluded that there was no evidence
of such disruption or of a violation of any school regulation. The vigorous dissent argued
that despite the majority's contention, "[c]omfort is given to defendant's contention that
she was protected by her 'academic freedom.'" Id. at 1116, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
41. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
42. Id. at 361.
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poses, not to provoke. In Mailloux v. Kiley43 the same court concluded
that a high school teacher could not be discharged for using teaching
methods which were not universally approved but against which no
explicit prohibition had been issued.
A conclusion drawn from these cases by one commentator seems
inescapable: the effect of these decisions is to
carve an area of autonomy in the classroom in which teachers teach
free of interference from school authorities and parents alike, so long
as the teachers can convince a federal court that their classroom
expression is relevant to
their curricular assignment, is balanced and
has educational value.4 4
This implies, however, that "the court has the last word on educational
value concerning the curriculum."45 As Judge Wyzanski saw it, Keefe
and Parducciestablish two kinds of academic freedom:
the substantive right of a teacher to choose a teaching method which
in the court's view served a demonstrated educational purpose; and
the procedural right of a teacher not to be discharged for the use
of a teaching method which was not proscribed by a regulation,
and as to which it was not
proven that he should have had notice
that its use was prohibited. 46
The customary professional standard in higher education has also
recognized a high degree of autonomy in the classroom. According to
the 1940 Statement: "The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his
subject. ' 47 The Interpretive Comment clarifies that
The intent of this statement is not to discourage what is "controversial." Controversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry
which the entire statement is designed to foster. The passage serves
to underscore the need for the teacher to avoid persistently intruding
48
material which has no relation to his subject.

43. 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
44. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope
of judicialReview, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1499 (1972).

45. Id.
46. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Mass. 1971) (emphasis
added). The First Circuit chose to treat the case, concerning the use of a taboo word
in an eleventh grade English class, wholly on grounds of prior notice. 448 F.2d 1242
(1st Cir. 1971). See text at supra note 43.
47. Supra note 10.
48. Id.
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Under this standard a teacher is somewhat freer than the foregoing cases might indicate in his subject matter and teaching method.
Indeed, a proscription, even if based on some body of professional
opinion, might itself constitute a violation of the professional standard.49 Thus a university case must bear the burden of distinguishing
the precedents established in secondary education and it seems that a
productive avenue for such distinction lies in the unique customs and
functions of higher education. Judge Wyzanski explicitly distinguished
a university setting from the secondary school by its tradition of independence, the usually higher intellectual qualification of faculty and
broader discretion in teaching method.50 This he related to the differences in function between the two kinds of institutions-the former
geared largely to the acquisition of new knowledge and a mutual testing and exploration of ideas by faculty and students, the latter geared
primarily for the transmission of established knowledge through traditional techniques and, to some extent, the indoctrination of existing
values. Here, then, academic custom may assist in informing constitutionally cognizable rights in higher education. Moreover, reliance on
such a body of custom much reduces the problem of scope of judicial
review which perforce has serious implications for the conduct of the
institution. 51
49. See Wolfe v. O'Neill, 336 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Alas. 1972) (an allegation by an
assistant professor of English that the expression of ideas in disagreement with those held
by the University of Alaska's English Department occasioned his nonrenewal was held
to state a claim under the first amendment).
50. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971). Accord Palo
Verde Unified School Dist. v. Hensey, 9 Cal. App. 3d 967, 88 Cal. Rptr. 570 (4th Dist.
1970) (dicta) concerning the dismissal of a junior college teacher primarily for several
incidents involving his use of language in the classroom. The court consistently points
out it is dealing with the junior college level but also finds that some of the teacher's
conduct transgressed the "limits of bad taste and vulgarity." Id. at 974, 88 Cal. Rptr.
at 575; McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971) where an academic
department voted 5-0 to recommend the nonrenewal of the plaintiff's appointment due
to his inability to get along with his colleagues, with which assessment the administration of a state college concurred. The court held that the standards approved in Drown
v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971), applied "with due recognition that a college presents a different context and has a different educational mission."
It affirmed the dismissal of the action noting that, "[tihe department may well . . .be
purchasing harmony at the expense of scholarly potential. Even so, the college can
surely prefer harmony in deciding which of its nontenured faculty members will be
granted new contracts. The reason is not trivial or unrelated to working relationships
within the college." Id. at 1111.
51. See Nahmod, supra note 44. The Second Circuit takes a somewhat different
view of Keefe and Parducci: "To the extent that these cases hold that first amendment
rights have been violated whenever a district court disagrees with the judgment of
school officials as to the propriety of material assigned by a teacher to students, we are
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II.

NONCONSTrruTIONAL PRoTEcrION

Other means of achieving judicial protection for academic freedom and tenure have been considered. Professor Cowan's provocative
tort theory52 has apparently not been pursued with vigor and thus

appears to remain in gestation. The possibility of vindicating academic interests through contract confronted a predominantly unresponsive judicial reaction based, not surprisingly, on a body of unhelpful traditional contract doctrine. 53
Some recent cases indicate, however, an emerging judicial sensitivity to the realities of academic life. The entering wedge seems to
center on the legal effect of standards for notice of nonrenewal of nontenured faculty appointments adopted by the institution's governing
board or followed in practice. In Zimmerman v. Minot State College,"4
the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the rules for notice of
nonreappointment adopted by the State Board of Higher Education
were binding on it and affirmed an award of damages for the failure
to provide timely notice to a nontenured instructor whose appointment
was terminated due to declining enrollment in her department. The
State Board had adopted a Policy Statement on Tenure in 1964, incorporating AAUP standards including a provision that no less than
twelve months' notice for faculty beyond the second year of probationary service be afforded. A statute then applicable to higher education provided that notice of nonrenewal was to be afforded no earlier
not in accord." Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457
F.2d 289, 293-94 (2d Cir. 1972). As Judge Mulligan, a former law school dean, put it,
"Academic freedom is scarcely fostered by the intrusion of three or even nine federal
jurists making curricular .. . choices for the community of scholars." Id. at 292.
52. Cowan, Interference with Academic Freedom: The Pre-NatalHistory of a Tort,
4 WAYNE L. REv. 205 (1958).
53. See Breen v. Larson College, 137 Conn. 152, 75 A.2d 39 (1950) (dismissal of
a dean for writing letters to parents critical of the president in which the court speaks
of the employee's duty of loyalty to the employer); Rhine v. International Young Men's
Christian Ass'n College, 339 Mass. 610, 162 N.E.2d 56 (1959) (acceptance of an additional year's terminal appointment beyond the maximum probationary period does not
confer tenure); Thomas v. Catawba College, 248 N.C. 609, 104 S.E.2d 175 (1958)
(dismissal for cause by institution which purported to follow AAUP standards in which
the court finds the dismissed professor had elected his remedy by accepting a year's
salary, as required in a dismissal by AAUP standards, in lieu of a suit for damages
which, the court concludes, would have been limited to a year's salary as fixed damages
in any event). For a discussion of the obstacles presented by resort to a contract theory
see T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIOHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 972 (1967) ; C. BYsE & L. JOUOGHIN, supra note 1.
54. 198 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 1972).
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than February 15 of the school year. The two provisions were, the
court observed, "patently inconsistent." Relying on Posin v. State
Board of Higher Education, 5 the court noted that the authority of the
Board, derived from the state constitution and statutes, included the
"full authority" over institutions under its control including the specific power to appoint faculty, fix their terms of office and adopt rules
for the governance of the institution. The court concluded, following
established rules of statutory construction, that policies adopted pursuant to such specific statutory authority took precedence over a conflicting general provision.
The case is noteworthy in two respects. First, it held that the
faculty member's employment relationship had to be examined in the
context of the Board's Statement of Policy, included in the Faculty
Handbook which the faculty member received when she was appointed
and which, the court concluded, comprised a part of her contract.
Second, though relying on Posin, the result seriously erodes if not
eviscerates the logic of Posin:
It is argued [said the Posin court] that the provisions of the College
constitution have the force and effect of law. It is, however, at most
only a rule or regulation approved by the Board. We think it clear
that the College constitution, considered as a rule or regulation, does
not have, and cannot have, the effect of diminishing, limiting, restricting or qualifying the power and authority vested in the
Board .... 5(
In Pima College v. Sinclair,57 the faculty handbook and calendar
provided a March 1 date for notification of nonreappointment. The
college, though required by the state-wide governing board to adopt
policies governing renewal, nonrenewal and tenure, had neglected to
do so. An officer of the administration testified, however, that the
college generally adhered to the state's teacher tenure law, 58 which did
not itself apply to higher education59 and which provided a March 15
notification date. The plaintiff faculty member had received notice on
March 11. The court said that reference to the teacher tenure act was
warranted inasmuch as some policy was required and the college gen55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

86 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1957).
Id. at 35.
17 Ariz. App. 213, 496 P.2d 639 (1972).
ARuz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 15-251 et seq. (1956).
Kaufman v. Pima Junior College, 14 Ariz. App. 475, 484 P.2d 244 (1971).
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erally followed it, save for the disparity in notification dates. Accordingly it held the college to its established practice and ordered the
faculty member reinstated.
What is thus far the most inciteful discussion of the contract of
academic appointment is provided by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court in Greene v. Howard University.6 0 Five nontenured faculty
members were notified in June that their appointments would not be
renewed at the close of the then current academic year. The University's Faculty Handbook provided that written notice would be afforded
before April 15 but "without contractual obligation to do so." The administration argued that its disclaimer of contractual obligation for
the provision of timely written notice relieved it of any liability therefor. The court disagreed, observing:
Contracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms
of conduct and expectations founded upon them. This is especially
true of contracts in and among a community of scholars, which is
what a university is. The readings of the market place are not invariably apt in this non-commercial context. 61
The court noted that the practices and customs of the institution could
be raised to the level of contractual obligation and noted also that the
faculty members had relied on them. The court was also particularly
aware of the assertion in the Faculty Handbook of the University's acceptance of AAUP standards for notice as a guiding principle. It concluded:
The employment contracts of appellants here comprehend as essential parts of themselves the hiring policies and practices of the
University as embodied in its employment regulations and customs. .

.

. Those provisions [of the Faculty Handbook] seem to us

to contemplate a hearing before separating from the academic community for alleged misdconduct one who, although a non-tenure
employee, has acquired a different dimension of relationship because
60. 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 1135. See also Bruno v. Detroit Inst. of Technology, 36 Mich. App. 61,
193 N.W.2d 322 (1971) where a faculty member in his seventh year of service was
offered a two-year appointment at a stipulated salary for the first year, the second
year's salary to be reviewed. At the conclusion of the first year he was offered the same
salary for the second year and when he objected his appointment was terminated due
to the lack of a contract. The court looked to the conduct of the parties, noting that
employment contracts should be strictly contrued against those preparing them. Given
the institution's practice of annual raises it held that the faculty member had a contract
for at least the stipulaed annual amount in both years.
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University's failure to give notice
of the expectations inherent in the 62
contemplated by its own regulations.
Explicitly following Greene, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico
held that the provisions of the Faculty Handbook of Eastern New
Mexico University comprise a part of the faculty member's contract
of employment. 63 Thus the administration was obliged to follow its
established procedures for the nonreappointment of a nontenured
faculty member, even though it had argued that its provisions were for
"administrative" purposes only. The court disagreed with the Regents'
argument that the Greene rule with respect to the Handbook itself
or to the "course of conduct" of the parties could not apply to a governmental body.

4

Against this background, the action of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in Fooden v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities° must be viewed as quixotic. Two faculty members in their
second year of service in Chicago State College were given timely notice
of nonrenewal. They charged inter alia that the procedures employed
in reaching these decisions were not in accord with college policy
which, they alleged, included AAUP standards, and that the reasons
for the action were constitutionally impermissible. The responding
62. Id. From a different perspective, failure to adhere to institutional notice provisions was found to have constitutional implications in Roumani v. Leestamper, 330
F. Supp. 1248 (D. Mass. 1971), requiring the provision of a particularized statement of
charges and a hearing.
63. Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 483 P.2d 1314 (1971); accord Smith v. Losee,
Civil No. C283-69 (D. Utah, Jan. 27, 1972). See also Downs v. Conway School Dist.,
328 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (holding inter alia that the school's published policies
comprise a part of the teacher's contract of employment); Griffin v. Board of Trustees
of St. Mary's College, 258 Md. 276, 265 A.2d 757 (1970) (appeal denied on procedural
ground but dicta agrees that rights could be claimed under a statement of policy
adopted by the Board incorporating AAUP standards but disagrees that a departure from
the policy was shown).
64. Cf. Gadzela v. Neumaier, 67 Misc. 2d 585, 324 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1971),
in which the court declined to view a course of conduct as giving rise to a legal right.
Plaintiff had been appointed to an administrative position in which one serves at the
pleasure of the appointing authority. She claimed academic status and tenure as a
result of reliance on the manner in which her salary was computed and the manner of
her listing on the salary roster. The court notes that only the Trustees or the Chancellor
of the University can award academic tenure and that even the local campus president
lacked that authority. As she had never received an appointment to the academic staff
the administration was not, as she alleged, estopped to deny that she had achieved tenure.
The decision seems far broader than the facts would warrant. The case appears best
explained on the narrower ground that a mere listing on a salary roster is insufficient
to maintain a "course of conduct" treating an administrator as a faculty member.
65. 48 Ill. 2d 580, 272 N.E.2d 497 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
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affidavit of the Board of Governors denied inter alia that the faculty
constitution was binding on the Board or that the Board had adopted
or approved AAUP standards as policy. The court affirmed the grant
of summary judgment for the Board on the ground that no factual
issues were presented:
We find that the Board's affidavit clearly refutes this contention
[on the applicability of AAUP policy] and that, as a matter of law,
the [plaintiffs'] contract was specifically made subject only to the "ByLaws, Governing Policies and Practices of the Board," and that the
Board's sole duty thereunder was to provide the notice of nonretention within the required time. Plaintiffs' allegations in their complaint on this matter constitute nothing more than statements of conclusions and do not present a genuine issue of fact in the face of the
uncontroverted facts set forth in the Board's affidavit. 60
Curiously, the court seemed to accept on the one hand that the institution was bound to follow its established policies and practices but on
the other concluded that the Board's affidavit was alone dispositive of
whether a particular policy or practice existed.6 7
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Perry v.
Sindermann s lends additional weight to the judicial recognition of a
professional or at least an institutional customary law. Professor Sinder66. Id. at 588-89, 272 N.E.2d at 501 (two judges dissenting).

67. A similarly restrictive interpretation of institutional policy was provided by the
Supreme Court of Tennesee in Sprunt v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees, 223 Tenn.
App. 210, 443 S.W.2d 464 (1969). The plaintiff had been Professor and Chairman of
Pathology since 1944. Under the Board's policy, amended during plaintiff's tenure, a
faculty member retires at age 65 unless continued on a year-to-year basis by the Board
with mandatory retirement at age 70. The plaintiff, who had apparently been so continued, reached age 68 in August, 1968, and was retired at the end of that month.
He argued that his retirement was for "cause" in that it was occasioned by a recommendation from his dean urging his retirement due to a dispute between them. The
court held that the Board's motives were irrelevant inasmuch as it had complete discretion to retire a faculty member after age 65 "whatever the motives of the Trustees
in so doing." Id. at 213, 443 S.W.2d at 466. It does not appear from the opinion that
institutional policy on academic freedom, including the academic of superannuated
faculty, was presented to or considered by the court. The court seems to treat a superannuated faculty member who loses his tenure by continuing on an annual basis after
retirement as if he were a nontenured faculty member first coming into the institution.
This is a murky area in terms of national practice. See Statement of Principals on
Retirement and Insurance Plans, POLICY DocuIENTs, supra note 10, at 70. It is clear,
however, that a decision not to continue a superannuated faculty member for reasons
violative of academic freedom is no less violative of academic freedom merely because the
faculty member is superannuated. The case is mitigated by the fact that the Trustees
did allow the plaintiff to appear before them accompanied by counsel to present his
arguments before it took action.
68. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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mann had been a teacher in the Texas state college system for ten
years, the last four of which had been at Odessa Junior College, serving
on one year renewable appointments. In May of his last year he was
given notice of nonrenewal and the Board of Regents issued a press
release alleging that the decision was due to his insubordination. Professor Sindermann sought redress on both substantive and procedural
grounds: i.e., that the reason for the action was violative of constitutional rights and that the failure of the Board to provide a hearing was
violative of fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process. On
the former the Court agreed that a claim had been stated. On the latter
69
it was faced with its decision in Board of Regents v. Roth that a
nontenured faculty member in his first year of service on a one-year
appointment had not such a "property" interest as to require, as a constitutional matter, notice and a hearing before the nonrenewal could
be effected. Professor Sinderman relied, however, on the college's
Faculty Guide which, while reciting that the college had "no tenure
system," went on to assure of the administration's wishes that the
faculty member "feel that he has permanent tenure" as long as he
performs satisfactorily, is cooperative and is "happy in his work." He
relied further on guidelines issued by the Coordinating Board of the
Texas College and University System which incorporated much of the
language of AAUP standards. The Court acknowledged that while an
explicit tenure provision is evidence of such entitlement or "property"
as to require cause for a dismissal to be shown, its absence may not
necessarily forclose the possibility of showing such an interest.
A teacher, like the respondent, who has held his position for
a number of years, might be able to show from the circumstances of
this service-and from other relevant facts-that he has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to job tenure. Just as this Court has found there
to be a "common law of a particular industry of a particular plant"
that may supplement a collective-bargaining agreement, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579, so there may be an
unwritten "common law" in a particular 70university that certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure.
The analogy to Steelworkers is both striking and useful. 7 ' Collec69. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
70. 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).

71. It is understandable that Greene should make no reference to Steelworkers
given Greene's clear reliance on pkofessional custom. It is puzzling, however, that Sindermann should have made no note of Greene.
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tive agreements are characteristically incomplete, frequently embody
ambiguous language, and cannot explicitly provide for every possible
situation which may arise. "The end result," observes one leading authority, "is a document with broad rules, a miscellany of gaps, unclear
language, and unsettled issues. To the parties it represents agreement,
even though they know that it is only the gateway to the resolution of
remaining disagreements. '7 2 Others have remarked on the governmental character of the collective agreement.7 3 Similarly, the "terms
and conditions" of an academic appointment are found, as Greene and
related cases suggest, in institutional policies, practices and customs as
colored by the practices, standards and customs of the profession as a
whole. The language of institutional policies, handbooks and other
regulatory provisions is frequently the product of a species of negotiation with internal faculty governing bodies and, equally, may leave
much to be desired by way of clarity but doubtless represents the terms
on which the faculty, administration and governing board understand
they will deal with one another. Such internal faculty bodies may
play a role in decisions affecting faculty status and discipline as a matter
either of regulation or custom. Thus upon appointment, an institutional status is conferred on the faculty member which may yield rights
to participate in as well as criticize institutional decisions. These
rights, in a fashion analagous to those enjoyed under a collective agreement, comprise a portion of the bundle of rights conferred upon consummation of a contract of academic appointment.
This approach was treated unsympathetically, if obliquely, in a
case involving the decision of the Regents of the University of California to deny academic credit for a course, half the lectures of which
were to be given by Eldridge Cleaver. 74 The course had been approved
through the established faculty machinery of the Berkeley Division of
the Academic Senate in early September, 1968. On September 20,
the Regents adopted two resolutions. The first prohibited anyone from
lecturing for more than one occasion in an academic quarter in a course
72. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525,
529 (1969).
73. See, e.g., Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48
COLUmn. L. REv. 829 (1948); Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1958). See also P. SELZNICK, LAWv, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JUSTCE

ch. 4 (1969).

74. Searle v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 23 Cal. App. 3d 448, 100 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1st Dist. 1972). The course was entitled, "Dehumanization and Regeneration in

the American Social Order."
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for credit unless he holds an academic appointment. The second provided that if the course in question did not meet that requirement
academic credit would not be given. The course was offered as approved and after credit was denied sixteen students (who had taken
the course) and six faculty (otherwise unidentified save that four had
been given responsibility to supervise the course) sought to compel the
grant of credit.
The court was guided by its intepretation of the constitutional
mandate that the Regents have "'full powers of organization and government' of the university." 75 It noted that the Regents had established procedures for the repeal or amendment of its standing orders
(pursuant to which the faculty exercise responsibility for the curriculum) and that it had failed to follow these procedures in adopting its
September 20 resolutions. The court held, however, that these procedural requirements were merely for the Board's own guidance and
benefit and cannot limit the Board's authority. Further, taking note
of Greene the court pointed out that "it is not pleaded or suggested
that any faculty appellant regarded or relied upon the standing order
as to the amendment procedure as a term and condition of his employment." 76 Even had it been so regarded, the court suggests that the
Regents' reservation of authority would also have comprised a part
of the contract thereby negating the result urged. Finally, the court
chose to characterize the controversy as "essentially whether the regents or the faculty shall control university policy in determining
whether credit is to be given for courses conducted by non-members
of the faculty. In light of the constitutional grant of power to the
regents, we have no hesitation in holding that this power is vested in
77
them."
In effect, the court's approach here is indistinguishable from that
of the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Posin78 which that court has
itself now abandoned.70 Indeed, the court's statement of the issue here
returns to the perspective of the 19th century cases noted at the outset
75. Id. at 195.

76. Id. at 196.

77. Id.
78. 86 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1957).
79. 198 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 1972). See also the court's treatment of the argument that procedural requirements adopted by a governing board are simply for its
own "administrative" convenience in Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 483 P.2d 1314

(1971).
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in viewing the dispute in essence as one of managerial prerogative.
That characterization blurs the really serious aspects of the case.
Clearly, the regents' general reliance on the faculty's experience in curricular matters found in the relevant standing order and its adoption
of rules governing any reconsideration of that reliance by way of
amending the standing order are relevant to the sound exercise of the
discretion given the regents by state law. To give effect to those procedural requirements does not involve the courts in the merits of the
decision nor does it require that the faculty position be adhered to
but does insure that the ultimate decision is adequately considered
consistent with the Board's own rules. Moreover, contrary to the
court's passing reference, Greene (and the cases following it) would
logically seem to comprehend the inclusion of institutional policies and
practices concerning curricular development as a term of faculty appointment. Though such matters are not bargained-for, anymore
than "hiring practices" or tenure policies, they clearly go to the faculty's
professional intramural responsibilities. From that point of view it is
doubtful that the general reservation of unfettered authority should
save the Board from compliance with its established policies and practices.
In reviewing this section, it is interesting to note that prior to
many of the decisions discussed herein the Harvard Law Review concluded that "the courts could attempt to fashion a special body of law
explicitly defining the professional rights and obligations of members
of the academic community-either within such traditional legal categories as contract or tort or by the formulation of a branch of the law
of private associations."'80 While a tort approach remains undeveloped
it now appears that a contract theory incorporating the customs and
practices of the profession is being pressed with some consistency toward
that end. 81 Such a theoy holds the promise of effecting a jointure of
80. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 12 at 1051.
Given the governmental character of the faculty's collective role in the life of the institution, which may be assimilated into the individual faculty member's contract of employment, the contract theory here presented does partake of a law of association. In
Galton v. College of Pharmaceutical Sciences, 70 Misc. 2d 12, 332 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup.
Ct. 1972), for example, it was held that plaintiff students, faculty, alumni, and student
and faculty organizations had standing to secure judicial review of the decision to close
down the college, an affiliate of Columbia University. Cf. Searle v. Regents of the Univ.
of Calif., 23 Cal. App. 3d 448, 100 Cal. Rptr. 194 (lst Dist. 1972).
81. See Whitson v. Hartford Seminary Foundation, No. 175492 (Conn. Super. Ct.,
Hartford County, filed Mar. 30, 1972) (action to enjoin alterations in educational program and resultant curtailment in faculty without faculty participation as provided for
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the common law with the profession's customary law; but that jointure
can be fully effected only after the questions of the scope of the custom
and the fashioning of an effective remedy have been satisfactorily resolved.
A. Scope of Custom
Justice Stewart's opinion in Sindermann, while relying on language speaking to the "common law" of an industry as well as of a
particular plant, goes on to conclude that there may be a common law
"in a particular university,"8 2 pursuant to which Sindermann might
have de facto tenure. Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court's posture in
Fooden 3 seems restricted to a consideration of purely local practice.
Neither opinion really confronts the issue, however, nor does any
sound reason manifest itself why a body of national custom should
not be so recognized particularly when one contemplates that the
American professoriate is fundamentally a national profession. 4 No
by charter and AAUP standards) (later settled out-of-court); Cook County Teachers
Union v. Board of Governors, Case No. 2350-67 (InI. Cir. Ct., Sangamon County,
1967) (action for mandamus to compel the issuance of a contract of academic
employment to Professor Staughton Lynd based in part on the meaning given an exchange of letters between officers of the administration and Professor Lynd by the
"customs, practices, and traditions of the academic community" including particularly
AAUP standards) (later settled out-of-court); Erar v. Assumption College, No. 4314
(Super. Ct., Worcester, Mass.) (action to enjoin termination of tenured faculty member
for alleged financial exigency as violation of the terms of the Faculty Handbook comprising part of the faculty member's contract of employment and governing the dismissal
of tenured faculty) (later successfully resolved, November, 1971); Sharples v. Wayne
State Univ., Civil No. 199-485R (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Feb. 4, 1972)
(action to enjoin the nonrenewal of 281 nontenured faculty based on institutional custom
and the standards of the profession nationally requiring faculty participation in the nonrenewal decisions) (later settled out-of-court); Muscarella v. Metropolitan Museum of
Art, No. 20960/72, (Sup. Ct., New York County, filed Sept. 29, 1972) (action to enjoin
dismissal of curator who had been granted "academic tenure" pursuant to museum
policy); In re Schulman, No. 10131/70 (Sup. Ct., New York County, June 26, 1970)
(action to compel renewal of appointment based on first amendment violation and incorporating, inter alia, failure to provide an internal hearing pursuant to AAUP standards as requested by the Faculty Senate of the City College of New York and failure to
abide by other procedures found in institutional regulations and customs) (later settled
out-of-court).
82. 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
83. 48 Ill. 2d 580, 272 N.E.2d 497 (1971).
84. See D. BROWN, THE MOBILE PROFESSORS (1967); T. CAPLOW & R. McGEE,
THE ACADEMIC MARKETPLACE (1965); H. D. MARSHALL, THE MOBILITY OF COLLEGE
FACULTY (1964).

See generally C. JENCKS & D. REiSIAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION

chs. I, IV (1968). See also cases cited in note 81 supra, in several of which AAUP
standards were expressly relied on. Moreover, in many of the cases discussed AAUP
standards have been adopted in institutional policies by reference or verbatim. Perry v.
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real obstacle seems presented where resort to such a body of custom is
used to give meaning to the broad language of institutional policy or
to fill the interstices of such provisions, i.e., what one commentator
referred to in the commercial context as translationaland additive
functions.8 5 In so proceeding, consideration of evidence concerning the
meaning of national custom most prominently found in AAUP standards and interpretations would be in order.86
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (language of the Texas Governing Board statement);
Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Mendez v. Trustees of
Boston Univ.,
Mass. , 285 N.E.2d 446 (1972); Griffin v. St.
Mary's College, 258 Md. 276, 265 A.2d 757 (1970); Thomas v. Catawba College, 248
N.C. 609, 104 S.E.2d 175 (1958). See also Holliman v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.
Va. 1971):
In the present case, there was no express provision as to termination of employment in the contract received by Mrs. Holliman . . . her "contract"

consisted of a salutary greeting, an offer of employment, a recital of the proposed salary, and a statement that the faculty was to be governed by the
American Association of University Professors' 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure.
Id. at 8. See also Board of Trustees v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1968) later settled
by a Joint Stipulation for Dismissal, No. PB-66-C-76 (E.D. Ark.) reciting that the Board
of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College "have heretofore bound themselves and again
hereby commit the Board of Trustees . . . to be guided and controlled" by AAUP policy.
The ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court in Fooden v. Board of Governors of State
Colleges and Universities, 48 Ill. 2d 580, 272 N.E.2d 497 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
943 (1972), foreclosed the attempt to show that the board had in fact adopted or
followed AAUP standards.
On the impact of AAUP standards, compare the conclusions drawn by Byse and
Joughin concerning the tenure plans in effect at 80 predominantly private "traditional"
colleges and universities in 1959, supra note 1, at 68-70, with the results of a sample of
413 more varied institutions in 1972. Furniss, Faculty Tenure and Contract Systems:
CurrentPractice,A.C.E. SPECIALREPORT (July 27, 1972):

It may be that, in the past, the policies and practices of large numbers of institutions were inadequate or repressive. This survey indicates, however, that
AAUP policies with respect to length of probationary period, credit for prior
service, written reasons for nonrenewal, and the availability of appeal procedures are widely observed....
Id. at 2.
The AAUP's judicial work has also been increasingly recognized. Belasco, supra
note 12, reports that in the six-year period of roughly 1950-1956 the Association
processed 363 complaints. In the 1971-1972 year the Association processed 1139 complaints; approximately 50% of those pursued to active mediation with the respective
administrations were successfully resolved. Report of Committee A, 1971-1972, 58 AAUP
BuLL. 145, 145-46 (1972). Regrettably, the Association does not publish its successfully resolved cases in a fashion from which it is possible to abstract a body of operational
principle.
85. Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial Dealings and
the Common Law, 55 COLUtm. L. REv. 1192, 1195-96 (1955). Some institutions are so
new as to lack well-defined purely local practices. See Schultz v. Pamberg, 317 F. Supp.
659 (D. Wyo. 1970) (college in its second year).
86. See the cases discussed in supra note 81. This may require a more active program
of litigation than the AAUP has thus far embarked upon. Regrettably, the legal com-
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In Mendez v. Trustees of Boston University,87 for example, a nontenured instructor of nursing who had served in the institution for
three years was informed in May that attendance for faculty discussions
the following September 1 was required. A month later she was
notified of the renewal of her appointment for the ensuing academic
year. She failed to report, however, until September 10, during which
time the administration's efforts to reach her proved unavailing. Her
absence, apparently unexplained, was not due to circumstances beyond her control. Accordingly, her contract was terminated for her
failure to appear and she sought redress based on the administration's
failure to pursue the termination procedures embodied in the Faculty
Manual explicitly incorporating AAUP standards. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed that the one page "Faculty Appointment Form" does not spell out the details of the relationship between
the faculty member and the institution and agreed further that the
Faculty Manual comprises a part of the contract of employment. It
observed, however, that the review machinery does not apply to one
who "resigns his position"88 and concurred with the trial court that
the plaintiff, having in effect abandoned the agreement, could not
claim the benefit of it-particularly where no services had been rendered. Thus the court treated the termination of a faculty member
renewed for a fourth year of service as if she had failed to appear for
an initial one-year appointment. Although this seems to be the kind of
case where evidence of national custom would be in order, particularly
in view of the fact that AAUP standards formed a part of the contract
of employment, it does not appear that such evidence was presented
or referred to.
The more serious issue is posed where local rules or practices are
in explicit contravention of national norms. As Professor Van Alstyne
points out, the Supreme Court in Roth treats an initial one-year nontenured appointment as if it were a special one-year terminal appointment.89 This treatment appears consistent nevertheless with the spemunity will be denied the resolution of this issue in Sindermann which might have
served as a useful guidepost particularly on the question of the effect of the Texas
Coordinating Board's statement incorporating national practice. Professor Sindermann
has settled his case. In Town to Get Check--Sindermann Politely Declines Job At O.C.,

The Odessa American, Nov. 12, 1972 at 1.
87. Mass. , 285 N.E.2d 446 (1972).
88. Id. at -, 285 N.E.2d at 448.
89. Van Alstyne, The Supreme Court Speaks to the Untenured: A Comment on
Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, 58 AAUP BuLL. 267, 268 (1972).
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cific regulations in effect for Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh,
although local practice tends to indicate a somewhat different treatment.9 0 It seems likely that for most matters, particularly those of a
procedural character, specific local provisions will be controlling. It
remains to be seen, as the Constitution is extended to protect academic
freedom in publicly operated institutions, whether the public policy so
clearly favoring the exercise of academic freedom will elevate the doctrine to the status of a "common law custom" forming an essential
part of employment contracts in situations where the Constitution has
not been held applicable. 9'
B. Effective Remedy
A contract theory confronts the common law rule against specific
performance of contracts for personal services. 92 As one commentator
has pointed out, the basis for the rule seems inapplicable in this area.03
First, damages are rarely adequate. Wholly apart from the disruption
of the faculty member's life and injury to his reputation the institutional action may have a chilling effect on the exercise of academic
rights by other faculty members. Second, the rationale of difficulty of
supervising a decree of specific performance ill fits the circumstances
of a highly autonomous faculty member. Moreover, what is frequently
sought is reinstatement pending the presentation of charges and a
hearing-matters with which the courts have some experience. Third,
it is anomalous that reinstatement may be awarded by an arbitrator
for breach of a collective agreement incorporating the "common law"
of the profession but not by a court, with its greater responsibility
90. That is, only 4 of 442 nontenured faculty were actually not renewed at
Oshkosh that year. Id.

91. One commentator has argued that academic freedom may be viewed simply
as an implied term in the contract of academic employment. "It is essential that the man

hired to traffic in ideas not be fired for doing so." York, The Legal Nature of Academic
Freedom, 48 BRIEF 246 (1953).
92. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1932); CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1204 (1964). See also Barden v. Junior College Dist. No. 520, Ill. App. 2d ,

271 N.E.2d 680 (1970); Felch v. Findlay College, 119 Ohio App. 357, 200 N.E.2d 353
(1964) (explicitly follows Restatement in denying injunction by tenured faculty dismissed without compliance with hearing procedures which court accepts as part of the

employment contract); Sprunt v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees of the University of
Tennessee, 223 Tenn. 210, 443 S.W.2d 464 (1969).

93. Comment, Academic Tenure: The Search for Standards,39 S. CAL. L. REv. 593,
603 (1966).
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for bringing public policy to bear,94 presented with the same departure
under an individual contract incorporating the same customs. Finally,
it should be noted that the common law rule is being eroded by the
complexities of modern business transactions. 95 It is, again, anomalous
that an automobile dealer of many years standing can enjoin the termination of his relationship with the manufacturer until adequate cause
is shown but not a university professor of as many years standing. By
so acting in the former case the courts seem to recognize what is
tantamount to a tenure system, but by declining to do so in the latter
fail to give effect to an explicit award of tenure. 96
Some tentative movement in this direction may be discerned. In
remanding for findings of damages, Greene97 seems to rely more on the
impracticality of ordering a hearing at that late date than on the recitation of the common law rule. Moreover, the court in Pima College9 s
was of the view that since, as a matter of custom, an appointment
would be automatically renewed once the nonrenewal date had passed
and as the institution's customary nonrenewal date had been exceeded
the appointment was renewed as a matter of law. Thus the court concluded that it could order reinstatement by way of mandamus inasmuch as no discretionary act was called for.9 9 Interestingly, it appears
that the Board of Regents in Hillis0 0 had argued that the failure to
abide by its procedures could properly result in a reversal of the decision to terminate but not in an award of damages.
94. On the respective roles of arbitrator and judge see Blumrosen, Public Policy
Considerationsin Labor Arbitration Cases, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 217 (1960); Seitz, The
Arbitrator's Responsibility for Public Policy, 19 ARB. J. 23 (1964); Shulman, Reason,
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAv. L. REv. 999 (1955).
95. See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir.
1970) ; Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn. 264, 137 N.W.2d 314 (1965)
(auto dealer franchises); Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, Inc., 1 N.J. 138, 62 A.2d 383
(1948) (participation in retailing cooperative); Harmon v. Tanner Motor Tours, 79
Nev. 4, 377 P.2d 622 (1963) (ten-year exclusive franchise awarded by board of county
commissioners).

96. One may speculate whether it would be easier to distinguish the rule if faculty
were deemed "independent contractors" rather than employees. One administration has
explicitly argued that faculty are independent contractors and not employees in attempt-

ing to pursuade the National Labor Relations Board not to extend jurisdiction to the
faculty. Brief of the employer at 3-5, In re New York University, Civ. Nos. 2-RC-15719,

2-RO-15757 (NLRB, Aug. 14, 1972).
97. 412 F.2d at 1135.
98. 17 Ariz. App. at 216, 496 P.2d at 641.
99. A similar result was achieved on a contract theory in State ex rel. Keeney v.
Ayers, 108 Mont. 547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939). The dissent relies on the common law rule
against specific performance of contracts for personal service.
100. Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474,483 P.2d 1314 (1971).
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CONCLUSIONS

The extension of constitutional protection from aprofessional to
professional activity, in tandem with a developing contract theory incorporating the practice and custom of the profession, have the potential of shaping a body of law particularly sensitive to the needs of
the academic milieu. They hold the promise of effecting a jointure of
the common law with a body of practice developed by a profession
heretofore chary of judicial redress. Interestingly, these developments
come at a time when the profession is greatly troubled 1 ' and, as the
foregoing indicates, when resort to the courts is becoming increasingly
commonplace.
More than a decade ago, Byse and Joughin urged judicial recognition of certain concomitants of status in the institution.1 0 2 The
emerging contract theory in particular is capable of maturing into a
law of academic status. Whether it will do so will depend in good
measure on the degree of acceptance of the profession's customary law
and the willingness of courts to fashion an adequate remedy.
101. For a far too simplistic outline of some of the reasons for the profession's
unease, see Finkin, The Dilemma of the Professoriate, 17 VnML. L. REV. 1010 (1972).
102. See C. BYsE &L. JOUGHIN, supra note 1, at 137-38.

